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ABSTRACT 
After briefly characterizing recent work in the study of community decision- 
making, the authors conclude that there appears to be some convergence on 
a number of common methodological strategies and theoretical and empirical 
assumptions. There still remain, however, important weaknesses in the over- 
all theoretical framework and its implied methodology in directing research 
efforts. Attention is directed to a theoretically informed structural 
analysis of the community influence system that derives from a Parsonsian 
perspective. Several critical questions are raised concerning the identifi- 
cation of the relevant set of community influentials, the systematic descrip- 
tion of their attributes as influentials (including their institutional lo- 
cations, influence resource bases, and selected attitudes and values), 
and the ties that bind them into shifting coalitions depending on 
the functional issue confronted. Recent methodological advances in 
graph theory and smallest space analysis are seen to provide means 
of examining the consensus-cleavage structure of community influence. 
Appropriate illustrations are drawn from the authors' case study of 
the community influence system in Altneustadt, a small city in West 
Germany. Highlights include a theoretically meaningful interpretation of 
a smallest space solution for the distribution of community influence 
resource bases, the development of a rationale for describing differentiated 
social structures which are constructed from sociometric information on 
business/professiona1, social, and community affairs discussion partners 
within the elite, and some systematic hypotheses about the linkages among . 
the three structures and between them and five selected issue outcomes. 
New directions in the study of elites 
Even a cursory review of three recent compilations of theoretical state- 
ments and research reports on community decision-making systems (cf. Clark, 
1968a; Aiken and'~ott, 1970; Bonjean, Clark, and Lineberry, 1971) impresses 
the reader with the number of new and promising developments and directions 
in the field. For years, the field was beset with rancorous conflict on 
methodological issues concerning the best way to identify and study a com- 
munity elite (cf. Walton, 1966a, 1966b) and.on theoretical/empirical argu- 
ments concerning the relative merits of a ruling elite or pluralist model 
of community power structures. Conflict has diminished somewhat as investigators 
have begun to assess and assimilate the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative theoretical and research strategies in designing new studies. 
A definite shift has taken place from the emphasis of the 1950s and 
early 1960s on comprehensive and intensive qualitative case studies of com- 
munities, usually taken one at a time and at one point in time following the 
classic leads of Hunter (1953) and Dahl (1961). The new accent is strongly 
comparative and quantitative. The.objective is to include as many communities 
as possible as one's units of analysis, utilizing a wide range of comparable 
quantitative data usually derived from published sources (e.g., The County 
and City Data Book). Time series or longitundinal data are preferred in 
order to permit analysis of social change. The emphasis tends at times 
to be excessively empirical, paying insufficient attention to theoretical 
issues in the quest for indicator.variables on as many communities as 
possible. 
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Nevertheless, a fairly explicit theoretical model underlies contem- 
porary efforts -- namely, an open-ended system or input-throughput-output 
model of community decision-making (cf. Clark, 1968b, 1968d; Bonjean, Clark, 
and Lineberry, 1971: 306-7). Figure 1 reflects reasonably well the account- 
------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------- 
ing scheme employed in a number of recent and ongoing studies (see, e.g., 
Clark 1968: 18; Downs 1968: 295). This open-ended model posits that 
certain features of communities, such as their population size, regional 
location, age, industrial and economic base, population stability, and economic : 
and ethnoreligious heterogeneity (i.e., "inputs"), are associated or determine, 
together with attributes of their political institutions, certain features 
of their decision-making apparatus, such as the degree of centralization 
or diffusion of decision-making (i. e. , "throughput") . These, in turn, 
determine which issues will be brought to decision and the decision outcome 
(i.e.,,foutputs").. Since the availability of data is such that there is 
much more "hard" and readily available information on the inputs and outputs 
and since data are more ambiguous or difficult to obtain regarding the 
nature of the decision-making apparatus itself, there has been some quite 
understandable tendency to treat the throughput or "elite decision-making 
core" -- the central object of concern in earlier case studies -- as 
a relatively Lnobservable "black box" about which only certain inferences 
or approximations concerning the contents are to be made. 
.rigure 1 . A frame of refcrences for the analysis of conlmunity influence systems. 
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We propose to make the contents of this black box the central concern 
of our discussion. We must, therefore, be more careful than sociologists 
normally are in conceptualizing and measuring social structure -- in this 
instance, the influence structure on the elite level of a community social 
system. 
Structure and various descriptive terms about structure such as hier- 
archy, dominance, structural differentiation, structural change, power 
or class structure, etc., are probably the most popular. concepts in the 
sociological lexicon. Despite the many differences in nuance associated 
with the term "structure" by various authors, the root meaning seems to refer to 
a persisting order or pattern of relationships among some units of socio- 
logical analysis, be they individual actors, classes of actors, or even 
behavioral patterns (cf. Nadel, 1957: 1-19; Mayhew, 1971). The apparent 
consensus in the usage of the term masks the unfortunate fact that there 
is little agreement on the concepts in terms of which and the methodology 
whereby one is going to measure, or perhaps more modestly, describe given 
I 1  social structures". But unless one can develop some way of adequately 
describing the structure of a system, he can hardly turn to the perhaps 
more fascinating problem of describing structural change in that system. 
A TOPICAL OVERVIEW 
From the vantage point of much current research activity then, our 
approach appears to be a step backwards inasmuch as we want to describe 
some of the theoretical and research strategies employed in an intensive 
case study of one small city, Altneustadt (a pseudonym) in West Germany. -
By redirecting some attention to the black box, we hope to strengthen our 
understanding of the mechanisms.whereby inputs are converted into outputs. 
Although we present some specific results, we wish to stress the more 
general implications of our theoretical and methodological approach for 
community elite research. - c6nsequently, we may sometimes be overly brief 
about the detailed empirical procedures used. 
The discussion will proceed in two parts. First, we shall sketch a 
frame of reference for the delineation of community influence systems. In 
it, the community elite is viewed as a set of incumbents of theoretically 
identified categories of social positions.   he description of the structure 
which results when these positions are linked in a pattern of specified 
relationships will be of focal concern. Four features of individual elite 
members will be noted: (1) their primary and secondary locations in func- 
tionally defined institutional sectors, (2) their relative influence stat- 
uses, (3) their influence resource bases, and (4) selected value orienta- 
tions and goal preferences. Some systematic propositions about their 
respective distributions in the influence structure will be advanced. 
Premised on some notions derived from graph theory in combination with 
smallest space analysis, a methodology will be described that is designed to 
generate a theoretically relevant description of the influence structure. 
Second, we shall discuss the structure of conflict in community influence 
systems. It is difficult to imagine a community comprised of a socially 
and economically heterogeneous population that lacks disagreements regard- 
ing the allocation of scarce community resources for alternative purposes. 
More formally, a central premise of our analysis, being good Parsonsians, 
is that conflict is an endemic, necessary feature of any community decision- 
making apparatus and poses the fundamental functional problem of integration 
for such structures, that is, the problematical process of establishing binding 
priorities among competing goals. Consequently, we shall devote some at- 
tention to how.conflict or cleavage patterns are superimposed on our pic- 
ture of the elite structure by proposing-a theoretically grounded strategy 
for identifying community issues and tracing their impact on the formation 
of oppositional factions and coalitions. Before turning to these matters, 
however, we shall briefly describe the community context which will pro- 
vide the empirical basis for our discussion. 
The Community Context: Altneustadt 
Altneustadt is a town of 20,000 inhabitants which is not dominated 
by a nearby larger city. The town is in rich farming country and serves 
the needs of a large agricultural hinterland. It is the district (county) 
headquarters for a range of governmental agencies with a correspondingly 
large number of public officials and bureaucrats. It also has a number 
of small and intermediate light manufacturing plants owned by local business- 
men. Thus, the town has long had a fairly diversified, mainly "middle class" 
occupational composition. About fifteen years ago, the State Government 
decided to build one of Germanf's largest natural science research centers 
in Altneustadt. This center is now the largest and most important employer 
in the community. 
The founding of the Research Center engendered a major migration of 
population into Altneustadt. Now, approximately one-third of the inhab- 
itants are NeubUrger. These Neuburger obviously have very distinctive 
status characteristics considerably different from those of the AltbUrger. 
Being for the most part University- educated and highly paid salaried workers, 
often of urban origin, the NeubUrger have strong cosmopolitan 
and urban values and perspectives. They even tend to have different relig- 
ious backgrounds, compared to the dominant Catholicism of the AltbUrger. 
These basic differences in world views and life styles between the Alt- and . 
NeubUrger have almost inevitably led to many conflicts and tensions in 
accommodating (if not assimilating) the newcomers. These conflicts have 
generated a dynamic political situation with clearly delineated and perceived 
coalitions and interest structures. This provides a setting to study a 
conflict structure very much concerned with what Lipset and others have 
called "status politics" rather than "class politicstt (cf. Lipset, 1963) 
since most major groups share roughly "middle-class" socioeconomic status 
positions but differ fundamentally in their conceptions of appropriate status 
behavior and styles of life. This, in fact, is the basis of our expectation 
that the central axis of structural cleavage in Altneustadt will be in the 
pattern-maintenance sector rather than in the economic or adaptive sector. 
Of particular interest is the fact that the SPD (German Social Demo- 
cratic Party), historically a party rooted in a working-class and predom- 
inantly Marxist world view, has been co-opted by the NeubUrger as the vehicle 
for expressing their urban, secular and middle-class demands for social 
change in Altneustadt. Natural scientists and engineers have not been tra- 
ditional recruits for the SPD. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), on 
the other hand, has proved to be a reliable vehicle of control for the 
AltbUrger. They manage to remain, albeit increasingly insecurely, the dom- 
inant political coalition. 
SOCIAL POSITIONS AND INCUMBENTS 
A. The identification of community influentials and their respective 
institutional sectors 
For our purposes, the unit of structural analysis will be the individ- 
ual actor (or a set of actors) - in a particular kind of social position 
(cf. Parsons, 1951). We thus come to the first crucial question to be an- 
swered: how are we to identify the domain of. relevant social positions for 
the community influence system? The objections against the reputational 
and issue approaches as methods of identifying elite personnel are well known. 
They mainly raise questions of validity and are less methodological than 
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theoretical in nature. The adherent of the reputational technique argue 
that the issue approach has a conservative bias insofar as it is impossible 
to detect the major impact of nondecisions on the status quo.. The ad- 
herents of the issue approach retort that the reputationalists only measure 
reputations for power. Despite these differences, both groups are asking the 
same question: who governs? This is the main difference between these 
two techniques and the structuralist, or positional, approach. The positional 
approach does not ask "who are the powerful people?" but "which positions 
possess authority or generalized influence in the sense that their incumbents 
can make binding decisions in their respective institutional sectors or will 
be consequential in the resolution of community-level issues?" Without 
being clear about how these several approaches differ in their initial 
questions, nothing is to be gained by recommending, as has been done, 
some simple combination of these three techniques as the best procedure 
for identifying community elites. 1 
Generally following Talcott Parsons' theoretical perspective on the 
structural-functional differentiation of the community treated as a terri- 
torially grounded social system embracing all aspects of social life (cf. 
Davis, 1948: 312; Parsons, 1960: 250-79), we identified prospective com- 
munity influentials as the incumbents of the highest positions of authority 
in organized collectivities whose primary functional responsibilities are 
in one of the four functionally specialized institutional subsectors at 
the community level of analysis (see Clark;1968dY for a recent exposition 
of the AGIL paradigm applied to community institutions; also D'Antonio 
et. al., 1961, for a.less theoretically'grounded, more "commonsensical" 
listing of types of community leadership personnel). 
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As Parsons argues in his paper on a general theory of formal organi- 
zation (1960: 59-69), there are three levels in the hierarchical structure 
of organizations: the technical, the managerial, and the institutional. 
It 'is this last level of organizational positions that is concerned with 
the articulation of the organization to its larger institutional environ- 
ment, both in securing the organization's legitimacy in the more inclusive 
system and in making its claims on scarce community resources, often, we 
might add, at the potential or actual expense of other organizations' claims. 
It is precisely on these grounds that we can analytically treat the commun- 
ity influence structure as the focus of the integrative subsystem of the 
community. , 
Not all community institutional subsystems, however, are equally likely 
to be completely organized into a structure of full institutionalized and 
functionally specialized organizations with a full complement of explicitly 
identified organizational leaders. This is especially true in the integra- 
tive and pattern-maintenance sectors of the community which tend to have 
less crystallized, more fluid organization. We attempted to compensate for 
this bias of the positional approach by supplementing our list of prospec- 
tive influentials with nominations by well-informed community informants 
of persons reputed to be community influentials who were not occupants of 
formally recognized positions. 
We wish to maintain a crucial analytic distinction between a social 
position and the particular actor who occupies that position. In general, 
incumbents of "influential" positions spend most of their time devoted to 
the tasks associated with these positions. But empirical analysis is com- 
plicated by the fact that a given actor may simultaneously occupy several 
"influential" positions in the determination of community decision-making -- 
that is, he may wear several hats. We propose to deal with multiple role oc- 
cupancy operationally by distinguishing an individual's primary institu- . 
tional location or position from his secondary position(s) on the basis of 
the amount of time he spends performing the duties of each. 
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B. The rank order of influence 
Once we obtained a list of 51 community influentials in Altneustadt (of whom 
46, or 90 percent, were successfully interviewed) according to the prin- 
ciples outlined above, we were in the position to ask: what is the relative 
influence status of these influentials? That is, can they be differentiated 
into a hierarchy of influence? This has been a classic concern, especially 
among those utilizing the reputational approach. Procedurally, we simply 
asked our influentials to indicate those on the list whom they considered 
I I now 'in general very in£ luential in ~ltneustadt and rank-ordered the num- 
ber of votes received by each person on the list. There is remarkable 
consensus among the 46 respondents concerning the top seven influentials, 
the top two of whom received 46 and 37 votes respectively. When we asked 
Herr K., who was unanimously regarded as "very influential", to name the 
most influential person in the community, he.replied, "Das bin ich." 
In an effort to devise at least an indirect validation of this influ- 
ence rank-order, we considered the following evidence. At the beginning 
of the interview before any mention of our list of influentials, respond- 
ents were asked to name persons and groups who were perceived to be on 
the supporting and opposing sides of five different major community issues. 
Most people mentioned frequently were on the influentials list. Thirty- 
eight persons were mentioned who were not included in that list. However, 
all of them were mentioned only for one issue and even then infrequently. 
We simply multiplied the number of times each person was mentioned as be- 
ing on one or the other side of an issue by his influence rank (assigning 
a rank-order of 55 to persons not included in the original list), summed 
the resulting numbers for each side, and divided by the total number of 
mentions on the respective side.. This number can be regarded as the aver- 
age influence status of proponents or opponents -- the lower the number, the 
higher the average influence status. (See Table 1.) We were able to pre- 
....................... 
' Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1. The average influence status of proponents and opponents on five 
community issues, with their winning sides indicated by asterisks.. 
Proponents Opponents 
Average Influence Status Average Influence Status 
Issue 
Adaptive issue primacy 
Industrial resettlement 
Goal-attainment issue primacy 
Construction of new city 
hall . . 




Secular vs. confessional 
school 
Permission to hold 
Pop-festival 
dict the correct winning side for all five issues (p = .03125) by picking 
the side with the highest average influence status. 
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C. Resource bases of influence 
We have considered the influence rank order within the elite and cer- 
tain of its consequences for decision-making. Influence is not, however, 
an inherent characteristic, but is based on convertible resources an 
individual has. We now consider the nature of the resource bases upon which . 
each member's influence rests and how they are implicated in determining 
the relative rank, scope, and domain of his influence. There is a volum- 
inous literature attempting to develop systematic distinctions among re- 
source bases and to link them to the influence process. Examples are 
Parsons' four media of exchange (viz., - money, power, influence, and commit- 
merit) at the societal level of analysis and his "influence paradigm" (cf. 
Parsons, 1969a,), French and Raven's (1959) five bases of power (in- 
cluding reward, coercive, referent, legitimate, and expert) with special 
reference to interpersonal influence processes, and Clark's (1968: 57-67) 
list of thirteen resources for power, prestige, and norm formation. 
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All of these enjoy a considerable degree of plausibility. Unfortunately, 
there have been virtually no empirical studies that have systematically 
attempted to assess resource bases and build propositions about their 
distributions and consequences with special reference to community social 
systems. (There are resource studies in experimental social psychology (cf. 
Cartwright, 1965), but their referent is the small group.) 
In order to generate a comprehensive analytic scheme that would help 
us specify.the relevant range of community influence resources to be con- 
sidered, we identified two fundamental aspects of influence resources 
that have often been seen to be relevant. As Weber first suggested, the 
locus of influence base distinguishes between resources that inhere in the 
social position itself (e.g., the authority of office) and those that in- 
here in the personal characteristics of the actor exercising influence (e.g., 
personal charisma). The second aspect of resource bases of special inter- 
est concerns their effective scope, generality, or convertability. Here 
we distinguish between resources that can be utilized in a wide variety of 
concrete influence situations as positive or negative inducements, 
e.g., money, and those that are more restricted (or particularized) in their 
efficacy to a limited range of appropriate situations in which they can be 
utilized. (Note the paralellism of this distinction to Parsons' univer- 
salism-particularism, Clark's generality of resources, and Dahlfs influence 
domain.) Treating these as dichotomous variables, we cross-tabulated them 
to yield a fourfold table. (See Table 2.) The eight resource bases were 
chosen so that two of then would fall into each of the four cells. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
We made a first approximation at the empirical assessment of influence 
bases of our influentials by asking our respondents to indicate one of 
eight resources for each influential whom they knew well enough to judge on 
that aspect. Each respondent also indicated what he believed to be his 
Table 2.  Ana ly t i ca l  Scheme f o r  C la s s i fy ing  Inf luence  Resources 
Generalized 
E f f e c t i v e  scope 
o r  c o n v e r t a b i l i t y  
S p e c i f i c  
I 
LOCUS of  i n f luence  base  
P o s i t i o n a l  ( i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  r o l e )  Personal  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of incumbent 
J 
I ! 
a. O f f i c i a l  decision-making author it;^ 
a s  e l e c t e d  p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l  o r  '.' 
occupant of a  h igh  p o s i t i o n  i n  
p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  
b. Power of d i s p o s a l  over f l u i d  
economic r e sou rces ,  p o s s i b l e  
g ive r  of c r e d i t  
f .  Power of d i s p o s a l  over  l e s s  
f l u i d  economic resources  such 
a s  land  o r  jobs 
g. Spec ia l  expe r t  knowledge of 
c e r t a i n  l i m i t e d  f i e l d s  6f 
community i n t e r e s t  
7 
d. General r e spec t  a s  someone who 
can mobil ize t h e  p u b l i c  f o r  good 
proposa ls  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  of t h e  
c i t y  a s  a  whole 
e. Honorable broker .  who can mediate i n  
a  nonpar t i san  way p o i n t s  a t  i s s u e  
h .  Good connect ions wi th  i n f l u e n t i a l  
persons i n  and o u t s i d e  of 
A l tneus t ad t .  
i. Inf luence  i n  c e r t a i n  subgroups 
of t h e  popula t ion  such as v o t e r s  
of a  p a r t i c u l a r  p a r t y ,  members 
of a voluntary  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  and 
SO on. 
own resource base. The list of resource bases is an attempt to synthe- 
size the previously mentioned lists, formulating them in terms that our 
"lay" respondents would find meaningful. Apparently we were reasonably 
successful in this effort since none of the.respondents had any difficulties 
in understanding what was wanted or in doing the task. There was a strong 
tendency for the respondents to attribute resources more frequently for 
persons in the higher reaches of the influence hierarchy where members 
are more visible. Respondents neglected somewhat the less influential 
members of the elite. There was consensus (in the sense of at least 50 
percent of the judges attributing the same base) for more than 64 percent 
of the influentials with regard to their putative influence base. Where 
individuals were attributed more than one influence base, this usually 
was justifiable given these individuals' overall profiles of characteristics -- 
that is, they actually possessed several bases of influence. 
Since the question proved to yield meaningful responses from the 
respondents, we could now ask whether there was a systematic pattern in 
the distribution of resources among the influentials. It should be noted that 
we did not have any theoretical expectation of a correspondence 
between the analytical scheme we used to specify the domain of influence 
resources and the differential allocation of these resources among the in- 
fluential~. On the contrary, we expected the resources to be differential- 
ly allocated among influentials according to their institutional special- 
ization, following Parsons. . 
We adopted a frankly exploratory strategy to study the differential 
allocation of resources by treating our list of community influentials as 
a set of common stimuli to which our respondents could respond with eight 
alternative responses. Indexes of dissimilarity were calculated 
for all possible pairs of influence resources by the expedient of percen- 
taging within resource categories across the 50 stimuli. These indexes were 
uniformly high, ranging between 52.8 and 97.5, suggesting considerable dif- 
ferential allocation of influence resources across the elite "stimuli". 
A smallest space analysis of this matrix of indexes of dissimilarity (cf. 
Guttman, 1968, McFarland and Brown, 1972; Laumann and Guttman, 1966; Laumann 
1969, 1972) yielded a good fit of the.origina1 matrix in two dimensions 
(coefficient of alienation = .108), which is portrayed in Figure 2. The 
farther away two resources are in the space, the more dissimilar they are 
in their patterns of distribution across the elite sample. 
------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
The first axis neatly divides the resources into three categories: 
economic or adaptive resources, informal influence or integrative resources, 
and an authority or goal-attainment resource. The second axis seems to 
arrange these resources along a generality-specificity dimension, that is, 
from (universalistic) resources that can be utilized in a wide range of 
situations, such as money or general respect as an "honorable broker" 
cap,able of composing differences, to more restrictively utilizable (par- 








"Authority" appears to be intermediate in its generalizability (perhaps 
reflecting the legally prescribed boundaries of authority domains). 
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D. Value orientations and goal priorities as individual character- 
istics of community leaders 
Most studies of community decision-making have primarily focused on 
the structure of influence in the decision process while relatively neg- 
lecting the systematic study of individual leaders' attitudes and values 
(cf. Bonjean et.al., 1971: 217-19). This neglect is all the more remark- 
able when one considers the central role that arguments regarding value 
homophily have played for both the elitist and pluralist lines of reasoning 
(cf. Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970). When investigators have attended to 
attitudes and values of leaders, they have naturally tended to devise 
scales of special relevance to the American scene and, as a result, of 
limited utility in cross-national comparativd research (cf. Agger et .al., 1964). 
Since our main theoretical frame of reference for structural analysis 
tr.eats the community social system decomposable into four subsystepls 
with different functional primacies, we concluded that the content of at- 
titudes and values should also be systematically linked to the same 
perspective in order to facilitate the development of meaningful hypotheses 
regarding value homophily within institutional sectors. 
One can usefully distinguish among three levels of attitudes d'ifferentiat- 
ed on the basis of their level of abstraction from highly general value 
orientations (i.e., very general 
conceptions about the desirable society or community), to somewhat more 
specific conceptions of the priorities among alternative, generally stated 
community goals, to concrete preferences on specific issues confronting 
the community at a particular point in time. Since there is considerable 
slippage in logical and empirical integration as one moves from one level 
of abstraction to another, we do not expect there to be anything but a 
rather general constraint exercised by an individual's more abstract 
orientations on his more concrete propensities to act (cf. Converse, 1964; 
Mayhew, 1971: 40-43) Given the limited time; we shall focus the discussion 
around two themes: first, on the general value orientations concerning 
the necessity of the hierarchical nature of society and community in the 
various functional sectors, and second, on the analysis of community goal 
priorities. 
The best single dimension for ordering political ideologies of various 
kinds is still the left-right dimension, not in the narrow sense of the in- 
tervention of the State in the economy (cf. Downs, 1957), but in the 
broader sense of egalitarianism versus elitism as these terms are treated by 
Lipset and others (cf. Lipset, 1963b; Klingemann and Pappi, 1972). With 
the contemporary counter-trends of economic, political, civil, and social , 
egalitarianism as a result of the diminishing importance of ascription in 
societal role allocation and the rise of egalitarian political ideologies, 
on the one hand, and the rise of new inequalities arising out of. differ- 
'ences in functional competence and achievement between incumbent6 of different 
positions (cf. Parsons, 1970; Laumann et al., 1970: 723-5), on the other, 
it is obvious that the values of the elite with respect to egalitarianism 
will be important sou'rces of consensus and cleavage in the decisionmaking 
system as they 
provide important sources of legitimation for their more specific atti- 
tudes on issues. Since one cannot assume a priori that the sector-specific 
values in a functionally differentiated social system are in complete 
harmony with one another, we developed scales of egalitarianism for each 
of the four functional sectors. For the analysis of value homophily, it 
is then possible to distinguish between sector-specific homophily and value 
homophily in the different coalitions irrespective of the primary sectoral 
locations of their members. 
Where it was possible, we chose scales which were already tested. As 
a measure of the value system legitimizing status differences in society, 
we administered a slightly revised version of the Index of Social Egalitar- 
ianism which bras originally developed by Melvin Seeman and used by Wendell 
Bell and James Duke (cf. Duke, 1967). The items of this scale give rational- 
izations for social inequalities, which are in large part still determined 
by ascriptive criteria, in terms of competence and equality of opportunity. 
For the political sector we chose a short version of the Political Equality 
Scale developed by McClosky (1964), and for the economic sector we used 
only one item measuring the attitude toward the current issue in Germany 
of co-determination of workers in managerial decisions in industry. As 
sex and age are the last important ascriptive criteria on the value level 
of Western societies, we included three items measuring traditionalism 
regarding youth and two items measuring traditionalism regarding husband-- 
wife relationships. All five items are concerned with the right to participate 
in decisionmaking of persons of lower ascriptive status. 
Turning to the matter of goal priorities, we found a question orig- 
inally formulated in a NORC survey to be a very useful measure for 
assessing goal prio~rities because the different goals included could easily 
be seen to be distributed across the four areas of functional primacy. 
Respondents were asked to rank order these community goals according to 
their 'relative importance. For the goals with integrative or pattern- 
maintenance primacy, the respondents could choose between a more traditional 
and a more change-oriented goal. Two pieces of information were generated 
by this question: first, a subjective measure of sectoral primacy for 
each individual, and second, a measure of his preference for stability or change 
in the integrative and pattern-maintenance sectors. The information on 
the ranking of the seven goals was reduced by a factor analysis to three 
factors, explaining 65 percent of the total variance. The hypothetically 
expected result came out quite clearly; the first factor standing for 
economic vs. political primacy, the second for traditional vs. non-tradi- 
tional emphasis regarding pattern-maintenance problems, and the third for 
a participatory vs. consensual approach in solving problems of group con- 
flict (integrative primacy). 
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
A. The theoretical rationale for the description of community influence 
structures. 
To this point in our discussion, we have been concerned with the 
problems of identifying the social positions and their incumbents who 
play consequential roles in community decision-making and of describing 
attributes of these positions and incumbents. We have thus treated selected 
aspects of the basic units of elite analysis. When we consider how individu- 
al influentials interact with one another, we become interested in describing 
the structure of their interrelationships. It is to this latter matter, 
structyral analysis, that we now want to turn our attention. 
Social structure will be defined as a persisting pattern of social 
relationships among social positions (cf. Laumann, 1966; especially 1972 
for an extended theoretical rationale). A social relationship is any 
linkage between incumbents of two social positions that involves mutual 
but not necessarily symmetric orientations, whether of a positive, neutral, 
or negative affect or whether of superordination-subordination or equality 
in the relative status of the participants (cf. Homans, 1951; Parsons, 1951; 
Blau, 1964). If social differentiation is defined as the differential 
allocation of socially relevant tasks and responsibilities among the set 
of positions in a social system, then a differentiated social structure is 
one in which there is a tendency for actors in these positions to confine 
their consensual relationships with others performing similar tasks. In 
other words, similar positions will tend to cluster, i.e., be in closer 
proximity in the structure, as a function of the higher density of their 
social ties relative to those with more dissimilar positions. One interest- 
ing implication of this definition is that the degree to which a social 
structure is differentiated into clusters of positions is itself a variable 
(cf. Laumann. 1972). 
A more important implication is the fact that one's model of social 
structure will differ to the extent that he considers different social 
relationships as the linking mechanisms for the set of social positions, 
e-g., informal social contacts, professional advice contacts, and so on. We 
are, therefore, interested in devising .a methodology that reveals how the 
pattern of social relationships is structurally differentiated along 
specifiable dimensions or facets (cf. Guttman, 1959). lo This usage of the 
term "structural differentiation" will be seen to parallel Parsons' 
(1966) usage. 
In order for us to be in a position to interpret the underlying dimen- 
sionality of the structures in which we shall be especially interested, 
we must accept a crucial postulate or assumption: 
Similarities in social positions, interests, attitudes, beliefs and 
behavior facilitate the formation of consensual relationships among 
incumbents of social positions. 
The corollary to this postulate is that the more dissimilar two positions 
are in status, attitudes, beliefs and behavior of their incumbents, the 
less likely the formation of consensual relationships and, consequently, the 
"farther away" they are from one another in the structure. This postulate 
asserts the distance-generating mechanism among social positions and in- 
cumbents. There is ample theoretical and empirical justification for 
accepting such a postulate as a reasonable starting point for analysis (cf. 
Homans, 1951, 1961; Newcomb, 1961; Fararo and Sunshine, 1964; Laumann, 1966, 
1972; and indeed nearly the entire corpus of the sociometric literature). 
B. The methodology of structural analysis: Graph theory and 
smallest space'analysis 
We shall focus on three social relationships among our influentials 
that appear to us to provide critical vantage points from which to view 
a community's influence structure. First, from an instrumental point 
of view, we want to be able to characterize the pattern of business- 
professional relationships.among the influentials since they are seen in 
both the functionalist and Marxist literature on community decision- 
making to be important sources of common interests and claims on the polity 
and should, therefore, reflect the lines of coalition and cleavage in 
the community. Respondents were asked to report the three other persons 
on the list of influentials with whom they were most frequently in contact 
in the pursuit of their primary institutional responsibilities. These 
are the task-linked, or instrumental, relationships that tie various or- 
ganizations and collectivities together. Second, we want to describe the pat- 
tern of "social" or expressive relationships among the influentials as 
it may be seen to reflect in part the common interests arising out of their 
instrumental activities in their respective primary institutional areas 
and in part shared values, attitudes and concerns arising from their 
participation in other aspects of community life. These latter derive from 
such secondary characteristics of the influentials as their religious and 
educational backgrounds and residence status (& vs. NeubUrger). 
Finally, we want to describe the pattern of "community affairs" relation- 
ships which are coalitional linkages among persons with regard to commun- 
ity affairs and may be hypothesized to be the "resultant" of three factors 
the business-professional and social structures and the distinctive polit- 
ical arrangements of the community (cf. Rossi, 1968). (See the bottom 
panel of Figure 1 for a path analytic model of these three structures.) 
Obviously all these concerns derive quite directly from the socio- 
metric approach to the study of community power structures beginning with 
Hunqer's work. In a paper written in 1959, Peter Rossi (1968: 132) 
quite correctly observed: 
... Similar amounts of thinking and effort have not been expended on 
invention of an appropriate methodology for studying other kinds of 
organized relationships among the members of a community. Although 
on the abstract level sociometric devices might seem useful tools in 
the study of large communities, on the empirical level they prove 
impractical. 
But truly remarkable advances in the methodology of sociometric or network 
analysis for large systems have been made since 1959, rendering Rossi's 
judgment considerably less cogent for the situation today. (Cf. Coleman and 
McRae, 1960; McRae 1960; Rapoport and Horvath, 1961; Harary, Cartwright, 
and Norman, 1965; Hubbell, 1965; Alba and Kadushin, 1970; Holland and 
Leinhardt, 1970; Kadushin, 1970; Rosen and Abrams, 1970; Bonacich, 1971a, 
1971b; Lorraine and White, 1971, and Levine, 1972). We shall briefly describe 
one such strategy applied to our data and some suggestive results that will 
serve to tie together the concerns of this and the concluding section of 
the paper. . 
A major o b j e c t i v e  of t h e s e  r e c e n t  e f f o r t s  has  been t o  develop theo re t -  
i c a l l y  grounded, r o u t i n e  procedures  t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  va r ious  c l i q u e s ,  
de f ined  accord ing  t o  vary ing  c r i t e r i a  of i n t e r r e l a t e d n e s s  o r  "choice" 
p a t t e r n s ,  i n  a  l a r g e  s e t  of persons.  A c o r o l l a r y  o b j e c t i v e  has  been t o  
develop g raph ic  techniques by which one can d e s c r i b e  how t h e s e  c l i q u e s  
and un re l a t ed  persons (who belong t o  no c l i q u e s )  are i n  t u r n  i n t e r r e l a t e d .  
The "sociogram" whereby i n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  r ep re sen ted  by p o i n t s  and 
choice  r e l a t i o n s  among i n d i v i d u a l s  by ( d i r e c t e d )  l i n e s  was an e a r l y  e f f o r t  
a t  g raph ic  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of i n t e r p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
( c f .  Hunter ,  1953; Moreno, 1953; Loomis and Beegle,  1951).  But once t h e  
set of persons  and number of choices  ( i . e . ,  r e l a t i o n s h i p s )  exceeded a  
r a t h e r  smal l  number, it was discovered t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  diagrams become 
f a r  t oo  complex t o  be r e a d i l y  i n t e r p r e t e d .  Indeed,  two d i f f e r e n t  inves- 
t i g a t o r s  could come up wi th  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  bu t  "equal ly j u s t i f i a b l e "  
g raph ic  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  of t h e  same ma t r ix  of choices  t h a t  i n  f a c t  might 
sugges t  r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of t h e  "same" s t r u c t u r e .  The 
advent of t h e  computer and t h e  development of s e v e r a l  mathematical and 
s t a t i s t i c a l  t echniques  t h a t  r e q u i r e  t h e  computer 's  l a r g e  computational 
r e sou rces  f o r  t h e i r  succes s fu l  a p p l i c a t i o n  have spurred  s e v e r a l  s t r a t e g i e s  
f o r  ana lyz ing  l a r g e  soc iometr ic  ma t r i ce s  (e .g . ,  Bonacich, 1971a, 1971b; 
Alba and Kadushin, 1970). 
We have combined two r e c e n t  developments, graph theory  and sma l l e s t  
space  a n a l y s i s ,  t o  desc r ibe  our  t h r e e  " r e l a t i o n a l "  s t r u c t u r e s .  
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Systematic  i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  t h e s e  developments and d i scuss ion  of t h e i r  
m e r i t s  a r e  found i n  McFarland and Brown (1972) and Harary e t  a l .  (1965). 
We mention only  s e v e r a l  concepts  from graph theory  t h a t  p lay  a  c e n t r a l  
r o l e  i n  our  a n a l y s i s .  
The mathematical theory  of d igraphs  i s  concerned wi th  t h e  development 
of  p o s t u l a t e s  and theorems r e l a t i n g  t o  " a b s t r a c t  con f igu ra t ions  c a l l e d  
d ig raphs ,  which c o n s i s t  of ' p o i n t s '  and ' d i r e c t e d  l i n e s ' . "  (Harary, 
e t  a l .  1965). A graph c o n s i s t s  of p o i n t s  and l i n e s  connect ing them i n  
which t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of t h e  l i n e s  i s  d is regarded .  Three graph t h e o r e t i c  
i d e a s  a r e  of s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  t o  us: an adjacency ma t r ix  (from which a l l  
of ou r  subsequent a n a l y s i s  proceeds) ,  r e a c h a b i l i t y ,  and pa th  d i s t a n c e .  
Consider t h e  fo l lowing  soc iome t r i c  (adjacency)  mat r ix  i n  which t h e  rows 
and columns r ep resen t  t h r e e  persons ,  vs, v2 ,  and v  and t h e  e n t r i e s  i n  
3 
t h e  c e l l s  a r e  e i t h e r  "1" o r  "0" t o  i n d i c a t e  whether v  ( i n  rows) chooses 
i' 
( i s  i n  a  r e l a t i o n  wi th)  v.  ( i n  columns) o r  n o t .  
J 
.................... 
I n s e r t  Mat r ix  1 about he re .  
This  ma t r ix  may be diagrammed, a s  i n  F igu re  3 ,  where p o i n t s  repre-  
s en t ;pe r sa r s  and d i r e c t e d  l i n e s  ( a r c s )  between two p o i n t s  r ep re sen t  
whether t h e r e  i s  a  r e l a t i o n  o r  n o t .  A p o i n t  v  is  reachable  from po in t  
j 
v i f  t h e r e  i s  a  pa th  from v  t o  v  , t h a t  i s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  s e t  of d i r e c t e d  
i i j 
l i n e s  from v  t o  v  . I n  our  i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  v  can reach v2 i n  a  pa th  of 
i j 1 
I n s e r t  F igu re  3 about here .  ' 
Chooser 




l e n g t h  "1" and v  i n  a  pa th  of l eng th  "2", and v  can reach v  i n  a  
3 2 3 
pa th  of l e n g t h  "1" bu t  v  and v cannot r each  v  The reachable  s e t  R (v)- 
2 3 1 ' 
of a  p o i n t  v  i s  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of p o i n t s  reachable  from v .  The p a t h  
d i s t a n c e  between two p o i n t s  i n  a  digraph is  t h e  minimum number of d i r e c t e d  
l i n e s  t h a t  must be t r a v e r s e d  i n  o rde r  t o  r each  t h e  second p o i n t  from t h e  
f i r s t .  (The p a t h  d i s t a n c e  between two p o i n t s  i n  a  graph i s  t h e  minimum 
number of l i n e s  d i s r ega rd ing  d i r e c t i o n  ( i . e . ,  t h e  adjacency ma t r ix  i s  
symmetric) t h a t  must be t r ave r sed  i n  o r d e r  t o  reach  t h e  second p o i n t  from 
t h e  f i r s t . )  Ter ry  Gleason (1969) has  devised  a  computer program c a l l e d  
D.I.P. t h a t  computes t h e  r e a c h a b i l i t y  and p a t h  d i s t a n c e  ma t r i ce s  from adja-  
cency m a t r i c e s  con ta in ing  up t o  200 p o i n t s .  Since we a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
t h e  presence  of a  p a r t i c u l a r  r e l a t i o n  between two persons ,  no t  i t s  re-  
c i p r o c i t y ,  we d e c i d e d . t o  d i s r ega rd  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of choices  by t h e  simple 
expedient  of symmetrizing t h e  adjacency ma t r i ce s .  
An i n s p e c t i o n  of t h e  r e a c h a b i l i t y  ma t r ix  ( c o n s i s t i n g  of "1" i f  
v  i s  reachable  from v  i n  some number of s t e p s  and "0" i f  v .  i s  no t  reachable  
j i J 
from v . )  immediately t e l l s  us which persons were disconnected from which 
1 
o t h e r s  i n  t h e  t o t a l  s e t  of i n f l u e n t i a l s  -- t h a t  i s ,  t h e i r  p a t t e r n  of choosing 
and being chosen were such t h a t  they could n o t  reach  p a r t i c u l a r  o t h e r s  
i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e .  A l l  of t h e  respondents  were reachable  from a l l  o t h e r  
respondents  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  and community a f f a i r s  graphs i n  some f i n i t e  
number of s t e p s ,  wh i l e  f i v e  respondents  i n  t h e  bus ines s /p ro fe s s iona1  s t r u c t u r e  
a long  a  s h o r t e s t  path 
were no t  reachable  by some o the r s .  The maximum number of s t e p s  from one 
A 
i n f l u e n t i a l  t o  any o t h e r  was 6 .  One i n d i v i d u a l ,  Herr  K . ,  who ranks  a s  
t h e  most i n f l u e n t i a l  
man in town, could reach in two or fewer steps 91 percent of the others 
in the community affairs structure and 73 percent of the others in the 
I I social" structure and in the business/professiona1 structure, respectively, 
Thus, from one point of view, we might conclude that our influence structure 
is highly integrated to the extent that essentially every leading influential 
can reach and be reached by every other influential in the community. If 
we observed many disconnected individuals or sets of individuals, this 
would indicate a less integrated influence structure, with consequently 
greater difficulties in coordinating community affairs or resolving issues. 
C. Graphic representations of influence structures 
But as interesting and suggestive as these and other results on reach- 
ability are, time constrains us to move on to what seems to us to be an 
especially fruitful analysis of the three matrices of path distances. By 
submitting each path distance matrix to a symmetric smallest space analysis 
(cf. Roskam and Lingoes, 1970), we obtain an acceptable Euclidean two-. 
dimensional representation of each matrix. In each representation the 
derived Euclidean distances among the points (persons) are a monotonic func- 
tion of the original path distances among the points. We propose to inter- 
pret these pictures according to the theoretical principles suggested in 
the introductory remarks concerning differentiated social structures in 
combination with our earlier discussion of certain selected characteristics 
of individual influentials, especially sector location and reputed influence. 
Figu re s  4 ,  5 ,  and 6 a r e  t h e  g raph ic  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s m a l l e s t  space 
----------------- 
I n s e r t  F igu re s  4 ,  5 ,  and 6 about h e r e  
----------------- 
s o l u t i o n s .  Each person has  been uniquely i d e n t i f i e d  w i th  a  code provid ing  
informat ion  r ega rd ing  h i s  i n f l u e n c e  s t a t u s ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e c t o r  respon- 
s i b i l i t i e s ,  i n f l u e n c e  r e sou rce  base ,  r e l i g i o u s  p re fe r ence  and p a r t y  
membership. The number r e p r e s e n t s  h i s  rank  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  r epu ted  i n f l u -  
ence s t a t u s  h i e r a r chy .  The f i r s t  c a p i t a l  l e t t e r  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
primary i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e c t o r  l o c a t i o n  wh i l e  t h e  fo l lowing  sma l l  l e t t e r s  
i n d i c a t e  h i s  secondary i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e c t o r s  i n  which he  p l ays  some a c t i v e  
r o l e .  The second c a p i t a l  l e t t e r  i n d i c a t e s  h i s  p a r t y  membership; t h e  t h i r d  
c a p i t a l  l e t t e r  i n d i c a t e s  h i s  r e l i g i o u s  p re fe r ence  and t h e  f i n a l  l e t t e r ,  h i s  
i n f l u e n c e  r e sou rce  base  ( s ee  F igure  2 ) .  (See legend of  each f i g u r e  f o r  
t h e  complete exp lana t ion  of t h e  abb rev i a t ed  code.) 
I n  g e n e r a l ,  w e  s h a l l  employ two b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  
spaces :  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of  i n t e g r a t i v e  c e n t r a l i t y  and t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of  sec- 
t o r a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .  The p r i n c i p l e  of  i n t e g r a t i v e  c e n t r a l i t y  ho lds  t h a t  
persons  p l ay ing  key i n t e g r a t i v e  o r  coo rd ina t ing  r o l e s  i n  t h e  t h r e e  s t r u c -  
t u r e s  w i l l  t end  t o  be  l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  " c e n t r a l  r eg ion f f  of t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  
spaces  -- t h i s  w i l l ,  on t h e  average,  minimize t h e i r  d i s t a n c e s  ( acces s )  t o  
any o t h e r  person i n  t h e  space  -- whi le  persons  l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  p e r i p h e r a l  
r e g i o n s  ( a t  some d i s t a n c e  from t h e  c e n t e r )  should be of  d e c l i n i n g  func- 
t i o n a l  importance i n  performing i n t e g r a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  f o r  t h e  community 
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social system and possibly of increasing importance in representing narrow- 
ly defined or interest-specific demands on the community system. Thus, 
this principle of interpreting the several spaces implies the identification 
of a coordinating center (delineated by a circle whose center is the cen- 
troid with a short radius) whose membership varies from one structure to 
anotherj depending on the nature of the'relationship upon which it is 
constructed, and a series of increasingly large concentric rings re- 
flecting, heuristically speaking, "zones" of declining integrative importance. 
The principle of sectoral differentiation divides the space into rela- 
tively homogeneous regions radiating from the center and including person- 
nel in the same institutional sector who share common concerns. These 
sectors represent potential, if not actual, "natural" coalition zones on 
community issues. Persons in a given functional (institutional) subsystem 
may at times appear on opposite sides of the center. When they do, they 
are likely to be in opposition to each other on some issues of common 
functional relevance. The less localized or regionalized a scatter of 
points (persons) sharing a common institutional locus, the more likely they 
will divide on issues of common institutional concern. The more localized 
a cluster of persons in a common institutional sector, the more homogeneous 
they will be in attitudes and values and the more they will function as a 
coordinated proactive or reactive claimant group (coalition) on community 
issues. 
By combining these two principles, we can offer two additional spec- 
ulations about the structure of the integrative center. First, we hypo- 
thesize that a position's actual location toward the center of the space 
but in a particular sector may be seen to reflect its potential integrative 
role as a representative for that sectoral interest since, on the one 
hand, its position close to'the center makes it influential, and, on the 
other hand, its location in a sector ties it to other positions in that 
sector. Second, integrative centers may be seen to be highly biased in 
their compositional make-up, "over-representing" cer'tain sectors while 
under-representing or completely excluding others. To the extent that 
certain sectors are excluded from central zone locations (i.e., all their 
personnel are located in the periphery at considerable distance from the 
center), we may infer that their impact on decision-making outcomes will 
be minimized. In other words, the decision-making structure, while per- 
forming Almond's function of aggregating interests, has an aggregative 
bias in favor of some interests and against others (cf. Gamson, 1968: 53-4). 
Looking at the three spaces (Figures 4, 5, and 6 ) ,  we readily see 
that they do differ among themselves in important ways. The central core 
of the business/professiona1 space includes only the top-ranked community 
influentials who occupy positions of authority at the city and county 
administrative level and personnel who control the largest economic and 
f.inancia1 interests in the general area and who, incidentally, do not on 
the average enjoy as high reputed influence status as the governmental lead- 
ers. These two groups presumably have much common intercourse concerning 
the coordination of governmental decisions that have bearing on economic 
matters, such as zoning, housing policy, etc., and vice versa. Control 
over adaptive resources (money, land, and jobs) and authority (power) are 
t h e  p r i n c i p a l  i n f l u e n c e  resources  r ep re sen ted  i n  t h e  cen te r .  Small busi-  
nessmen, r e l i g i o u s , . e d u c a t i o n a l ,  and Research Center  personnel  a r e  r e l e -  
ga ted  t o  t h e  p e r i p h e r a l  zones but  i n  c l e a r l y  demarcated s e c t o r s  a t  some 
cons ide rab le  d i s t a n c e  from one another .  
The c e n t r a l  core  of t h e  s o c i a l  space i s  composed of a r a t h e r  
d i f f e r e n t  s e t  of personnel ,  almost a l l  of whom a r e  l o n g . r e s i d e n t ,  
Ca tho l i c  members of t h e  dominant CDU c o a l i t i o n  i n  t h e  c i t y  t h a t  has  run  
t h e  community f o r  many yea r s .  It i s  noteworthy t h a t  high reputed  i n f l u -  
ence i s  n o t  concent ra ted  i n  t h e  c e n t e r .  I n f l u e n c e  resources  i n  t h e  c e n t e r  
a r e  p r i m a r i l y  a u t h o r i t y  and i n f l u e n c e  -- no adap t ive  'resources a r e  rep- 
r e sen ted  i n  t h i s  core  group. The d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of t h e  economic s e c t o r  
. . 
i s  almost t h e  p r e c i s e  r e v e r s e  t o  t h e  b u s i n e s s / p r o f e s s i o n a l  space a s  i t  
moves from t h e  c e n t e r  which inc ludes  small.downtown businessmen and mer- 
chan t s  t o  t h e  pe r iphe ry  a r e a  which inc ludes  managers and owners of l a r g e  
manufactur ing,  f i n a n c i a l ,  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  l oca t ed  o u t s i d e  
t h e  c i t y  l i m i t s .  The Research personnel  a r e  l o c a t e d  by themselves a t  
some cons ide rab le  d i s t a n c e  from t h e  c e n t e r  and from t h e  o t h e r  s e c t o r s ,  
r e f l e c t i n g  t h e i r  h igh ly  segrega ted  e x i s t e n c e  i n  t h e  " s o c i a l  l i f e "  of t h e  
community. The t r a d i t i o n a l  r e l i g i o u s  and educa t iona l  e l i t e  a r e  l oca t ed  
oppos i t e  them i n  t h e  space. Herr B . ,  12SabCRI, i s  t h e  only Research Center 
person who has  been f u l l y  a s s i m i l a t e d  i n  t h e  sense  of being loca t ed  i n  t h e  
c e n t r a l  zone of t h e  s o c i a l  space ,  bu t  he d i f f e r s  from h i s  co l leagues  at 
t h e  Research Center  on n e a r l y  every  key count -- he i s  a  Ca tho l i c  r a t h e r  
than a Protestant, a political economist rather than a natural scientist, 
and a convert from the SPD to the CDU since his arrival in Altneustadt. 
Finally, the central core of the community affairs space includes a 
higher density of personnel than the other spaces who are recruited from 
much more heterogeneous institutional sectors, political and religious 
backgrounds, and among whom all the types of influence resources are rep- 
resented. As one should expect, center personnel are more homogeneous on 
the reputed influence status in that they tend to be seen as belonging in 
the upper reaches of the influence hierarchy. The sectoral divisions, 
especially toward the periphery, are very similar in character to those of 
the other two spaces. 
If we correlate reputed influence status as a community influential 
with distance from the centroid of each of three spaces, we find signifi- 
cant correlations for the business/professiona1 structure (.403) and the 
community affairs structure (.298) but an insignificant correlation of 
.I74 for the social structure. If we are prepared to regard reputed in- 
fluence status as a crude indicator of relative "integrative" status in 
the comaunity social system, then we can take these correlations as at 
least consistent with but by no means dramatic confirmation of our prin- 
ciple of integrative centrality. We might speculate further that integra- 
tive status may mean rather different things in these three relational 
contexts. Reputed influence status as a community influential is clearly 
more relevant to the community affairs and business/professiona1 structures 
but is not especially relevant for the social integration of the community 
e l i te .  I f  we had a s s e s s e d  " s o c i a l  prominence and esteem" i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  
Rober t  D a h l ' s  (1961) " s o c i a l  n o t a b l e s " ,  w e  might  w e l l  have found t h a t  
t h i s  was a more a p p r o p r i a t e  i n d i c a t o r  o f  i n t e g r a t i v e  s t a t u s  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  and was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  c e n t r a l i t y  i n  t h a t  s t r u c t u r e .  
How are t h e s e  t h r e e  s t r u c t u r e s  r e l a t e d  t o  one  a n o t h e r ?  We have al- 
ready  i m p l i e d  t h a t  t h e y  a f e  s i m i l a r  t o  one a n o t h e r  b u t  a r e  n o t  by any means 
i d e n t i c a l  s i n c e  t h e y  r e f l e c t  r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  p r o c e s s e s  f o r  fo rming  s o c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  I n  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  F i g u r e  1 o u t l i n i n g  o u r  g e n e r a l  theo-  
r e t i c a l  model,  w e  o f f e r e d  i n  t h e  bottom p a n e l  a p a t h  model o f  t h e  t h r e e  
s t r u c t u r e s  i n  which we a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  community a f f a i r s  s t r u c t u r e  was a j o i n t  
p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s / p r o f e s s i o n a 1  and s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e s ,  w i t h  t h e  s o c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  b e i n g  a  r e s u l t a n t  i n  p a r t  of t h e  b u s i n e s s / p r o f e s s i o n a 1  s t r u c t u r e .  
W e  a t t e m p t e d  a c r u d e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h i s  model by c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  product-  
moment c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  Euc l idean  d i s t a n c e s  o f  a l l  p a i r s  o f  p o i n t s  
(63 824) i n  t h e  t h r e e  s p a c e s .  T h i s  s t r a t e g y  p r e s e r v e s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  
l o c a t i o n s  o f  a l l  p o i n t s  a c r o s s  t h e  t h r e e  s p a c e s  even though t h e  a x e s  them- 
s e l v e s  may a r b i t r a r i l y  f l i p - f l o p  from one s p a c e  t o  t h e  n e x t .  F i g u r e  7 
p r e s e n t s  t h e  p a t h  c o e f f i c i e n t s  f o r  t h i s  model. The m u l t i p l e  R i s  .459, 
which means t h a t  21.1 p e r c e n t  of t h e  v a r i a n c e  i n  t h e  community a f f a i r s  
s t r u c t u r e  i s  accounted  by t h e  o t h e r  two s t r u c t u r e s .  What is  s t r i k i n g  is  
t h a t  t h e  b u s i n e s s / p r o f e s s i o n a 1  s t r u c t u r e ,  h a s  no d i r e c t  e f f e c t  on t h e  com- 
munity a f f a i r s  s t r u c t u r e  -- i t  i s  mediated e n t i r e l y  th rough  t h e  s o c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  on which i t  h a s  a r a t h e r  s t r o n g  impac t .  
I n s e r t  F i g u r e  7 a b o u t  h e r e  
Figure 7. A path model of the structural determinants of the 
community affairs structure 
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THE OUTCOME OF INFLUENCE STRUCTURES 
A. Community issues 
Persons who are concerned with the analysis of dissensus and conflict 
over the resolution of various community issues may well ask how our struc- 
tural analysis deals with such matters. Our emphasis on describing the 
structure of the black box responsible for community integration from a 
Parsonsian standpoint seems to confirm the often repeated charge that the 
framework is simply too static and cannot adequately handle conflict and 
change (cf. Dahrendorf, 1961: 77-82; Gouldner, 1970: 353-55). Although 
we cannot hope to answer satisfactorily all these objections, we would like 
to consider these questions. 
Recall our discussion of Figure 1 which schematized our theoretical 
framework. We wanted first to open the black box of "throughput" to 
analyze its internal contents. We wanted then to use knowledge of the 
structure to clarify (a) the structure of consensus and cleavage in the 
integrative system and (b) the resulting outcomes in binding collective 
decisions on particular issues and the extent and sources of community 
tensions. 
In order to specify a bit more precisely the nature of these outcomes 
and tensions, it is useful to distinguish between two broad types of issues 
and their related outcomes. On the one hand, instrumental issues are con- 
cerned with controversies over the differential allocation of scarce resources, 
such as land, jobs, and money, and find their particular focus in the adap- 
tive and integrative sectors of community concern. Lipset (1963a) and 
others have spoken somewhat more narrowly of "class politics" when discuss- 
ing such issues. For such issues there usually is a fairly obvious cal- 
culus of costs and benefits to various interested parties. As a result, a 
fairly straightforward, even quantitative, analysis of objective interest 
differentiation is facilitated. Conflict over such issues tends to be 
moderate, often characterized by bargaining and compromise among the' contend- 
ing parties. The specific outcome is the direct result of their relative 
power or influence. Some political scientists have even thought it possible 
to devise means for the "rational" or "optimal" resolution of such contro- 
versies. 
Consummatory or expressive issues, on the other hand, are concerned 
with controversies regarding the maintenance or change in the organization 
of basic values, commitments, and orientations that shall guide or control 
community affairs. Such controversies, sometimes termed "status politics" 
(cf. Lipset, 1963a), are usually highly charged with emotional affect and 
have an "all or none" nature that usually precludes or .makes very difficult 
negotiated settlements among the contending parties. Thus, the nature of 
the outcome and the level of community tensions often directly depends upon 
how a given issue comes to be defined as one or the other type of issue. As we 
shall see, this distinction is closely related to the functional perspective 
on community issues elaborated below. 
In our view, one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the literature 
on community decision-making has been the basically atheoretical, ad hoc 
selection of community issues for analysis such that comparative study of 
community decision-making is difficult if not impossible. l3 h e  can 
identify two favored strategies for the identification and selection of 
community issues. In the first strategy, the investigator identifies a 
set of recent issues in a community from newspaper accounts and community 
informants and selects those for intensive study that meet some criterion 
of "importance to the community," such as the level of public controversy 
and mobilization (cf. Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963; Freeman et al., 1968). In 
the second strategy, the investigator selects an issue in which he already 
has some interest, perhaps because of his interest in a preferred outcome, 
such as fluoridation of the water supply (cf. Gamson, 1966; Rosenthal and 
Crain, 1966) or urban renewal (Hawley, 1963; Clark, 1968e), and which has 
come up for resolution in a number of communities. He wants to ascertain 
what factors determine a particular outcome. While both strategies enjoy the 
obvious advantage of relatively clear, unambiguous operational procedures, 
they both suffer from being heavily tied to all the historical particularities 
of the specific issues studied and pose serious problems, especially in the 
first strategy, for comparative analysis. 
As Polsby (1963: 96) pointed out some years ago, "there seem to be 
no satisfactory criteria which would identify a universe of all decisions 
(issues) in the community" and Wolfinger (1971: 1078) is equally skeptical 
in a more recent article. The problem of defining the universe of content 
from which to sample issues is especially important when one wants to iden- 
tify "non-issues" or check whether the actual issues are a biased sample. 
We think that it is impossible to define a universe of content without an 
adequate  frame of r e f e r e n c e  $or  s tudying  community power. A t  p r e sen t  only 
two frames of r e f e r e n c e  seem t o  be a v a i l a b l e :  t h e  i n t e r e s t  group approach 
and t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  approach. The i n t e r e s t  group approach looks f o r  p o s s i b l e  
p a r t i s a n  groups i n  a  community and i d e n t i f i e s  p o s s i b l e  i s s u e s  according 
t o  some no t ion  of t h e  o b j e c t i v e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e s e  groups. Since we used 
t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  approach f o r  ana lyz ing  t h e  decision-making s t r u c t u r e ,  i t  
fo l lows  t h a t  we should use t h e  same approach t o  d e f i n e  t h e  universe  of 
conten t  of p o s s i b l e  i s s u e s .  
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While i t  may sound hope le s s ly  ambifious a t  t h i s  s t a g e  of development, 
a  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  grounded scheme f o r  d e f i n i n g  and c l a s s i f y i n g  community i s s u e s  
i s  needed t h a t  permi ts :  (1) a  d e f i n i t i o n  of  t h e  un ive r se  of conten t  of 
p o s s i b l e  community i s s u e s ;  (2) a  means of d e f i n i n g  t h e  b i a s e s  i n  t h e  s e t  
of i s s u e s  t h a t  a c t u a l l y  a r i s e  i n  a  community dur ing  a given pe r iod  ( t h a t  
i s ,  communities confront  i s s u e s  s e q u e n t i a l l y  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  any per iod  
of t ime may n o t  f a c e  i s s u e s  from t h e  f u l l  range  of t h e  i s s u e  space ) ;  (3)  a 
t r a n s l a t i o n  of t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  of  a  given i s s u e  i n t o  a more 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  meaningful category t h a t  permi ts  comparative a n a l y s i s ;  and 
(4) t h e  gene ra t ion  of sys temat ic  hypotheses l i n k i n g  t h e  type  of  i s s u e  t o  
s t r u c t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  community decision-making system. W e  hope 
t h a t  a very modest s t e p  toward cons t ruc t ing  such a  scheme was taken by our 
d e c i s i o n  t o  c l a s s i f y  community i s s u e s  accord ing  t o  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n a l  primacy 
i n  t h e  AGIL paradigm of func t ions  confront ing  any s o c i a l  system ( c f .  Parsons,  
1951, 1961; Clark ,  1968d; Mayhew, 1971).  
Obviously i s s u e s  w i l l  o f t e n  have imp l i ca t ions  f o r  s e v e r a l  func t iona l  
s e c t o r s  of t h e  community s o c i a l  system. Much i n  t h e  same way t h a t  we pro- 
posed to distinguish between primary and secondary functional foci for 
... :.. - 
our influentials, issues may be.seen to have primary and secondary impacts in 
different institutional sectors. TJhich of the possible functional defini- 
tions will depend on a series of considerations about its emergence of an 
issue becomes focal or primary in a particular community at a particular 
point in time with particular sponsors and opponents. l5 I£ one can satis- 
factorily solve the operational problems of distinguishing among primary 
and secondary sectors for issues, then perhaps one can make some interesting 
predictions about which institutional sectors are most likely to ba activated 
and participate in the resolution of given issues (these should differ 
according to the functional primacy of the issue) and what kinds of influence 
resources will be most relevant and effective (adaptive resources, such as 
money, jobs, and land, may be of little consequence in a pattern-maintenance 
issue where persons controlling commitment and integrative resources may 
have the competitive advantage). 
With a prior structural analysis of influence (as in the preceding 
section), we should be able to predict how given issues will be resolved 
by determining the functionally specialized sectors likely to be activated 
by a given functional issue. We can also assess the likelihood of the sector 
being divided on the issue by examining the relative spread or clustering of 
personnel in a particular instituti'onal sector in the spatial solutions and 
their locations with respect to the central integrative core. If there is 
significant sectoral or integrative differentiation, we can predict the 
winning coalition as the one which is favorably located relative to the in- 
tegrative core, controls more "appropriate" influence resources, and in- 
cludes a higher average level of reputed community influence. 
With these general considerations in mind, we selected five issues for 
our study of Altneustadt's decision-making system according to two criteria. 
First, they must have had a major impact on community affairs within the 
past three or four years or might realistically be argued to have such an 
impact if they became matters for decision in the future. Second, they 
should be distributed across the four functional problem areas identified 
in the AGIL paradigm. The issues meeting these two critera were as follox?s: 
(a) industrial re-settlement in Altneustadt (economic or adaptive primacy); 
(b) construction ofa city hall (political or collective goal- 
attainment primacy); 
(c) incorporation of outlying communities into an expanded city ad- 
ministrative unit (integrative primacy); 
(d) establishment of a secular primary school as opposed to the existing 
confessional school (latent pattern-maintenance primacy -- education 
and religion); and 
(e) permission to hold a Pop Festival in Altneustadt (latent pattern- 
maintenance primacy, public morality, status of youth as a "minority" 
group with low access to center of power; intergenerational conflict). 16 
The underlying notion here of sampling issues from various institutional 
sectors was to provide an opportunity to determine if the elite tended to be 
correspondingly differentiated into coalitions functionally specialized 
for "control" in specific sectors or if there was a functionally and struc- 
turally undifferentiated unitary elite core (dominant coalition) that made 
the crucial decisions for all institutional areas (perhaps with specialized 
11 lower-level" personnel to .implement these decisions). (See Table 1 for 
average influence status of opponents and proponents on the five issues.) 
B. Graphic representation of the cleavage~structure 
Figures 8, 9, and 10 present the'same three spatial representations 
Insert figures 8, 9, & 10 about here. 
of the business/professiona1, social, and community affairs structures 
that we considered in the preceeding section, only now we have drawn in 
"fault lines" for each of the five issues that more or less 'divide the 
respective spaces into proponents and opponents on each issue. Before 
discussing these consensus-cleavage structures in greater detail, 
observations must be made that bear on the operational independence 
of'our various procedures. First, each respondent was asked at the begin- 
ning of the interview a series of questions about each issue concerning 
such matters as the individuals and groups he perceived to be most strongly 
in favor or opposed to the issue, his own position on the issue and degree 
of participation in the decision-process on the issue, as well as his 
estimate of the level of conflict over the issue and whether the conflict 
was public or confined to the "inner circle" of community influentials. 
The names of the participants, pro and con, were spontaneously generated by 
the respondents -- the list of influentials we had identified was not 
presented until much later in the interview. Second, in order for us to 
Figure 8 
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designate an influential as an active proponent or opponent on an issue, 
at least two respondents had to have spontaneously mentioned him in one 
or the other capacity. (In most cases attributed and self-reported po- 
sition and involvement in the issue were the same, but in several impor- 
tant cases they were not. Persons on the losing side tended to report 
themselves on the winning side.), 
It is readily apparent from an inspection of the several pictures, 
especially the social and community affairs pictures, that the fault lines 
of the oppositional structures and the personnel active on each of the is- 
sues do change from one functional issue to another about as expected and 
that some persons, most notably those in the central integrative zones, 
are likely to be active in more than one issue. In fact, only one person, 
the most influential man in town, was perceived to be involved in all 
five issues. 
For illustrative purposes we can look more carefully at the social 
space (Figure 9). The fault lines are almost identical on the two pattern- 
maintenance issues, the school and the Pop.Festiva1, with the newcomers 
at the Research Center and their allies opposed to nearly everyone else. 
These issues differ considerably in their substantive content. The inte- 
grative issue (community incorporation), on the other hand, unites all 
city factions against the county political leadership, while the polity 
issue of building a new city hall was an inner-elite controversy (there 
was low public controversy about this issue), arraigning the "city hall 
crowd" located in the central zone against the periphery who, of course, 
lost. Finally, the industrial resettlement issue split the economic sector 
(which you will recall is rather widely scattered in the space) between 
the large employers who might be fearful of such a large competitor for 
a limited labor supply (at least in the short term) and possible disruption 
of their favorable location in the influence structure and the small retail 
tradesmen and business people who probably would welcome the expanded bus- 
iness opportunities arising from the substantial population growth likely 
to be generated by the new employer. 
Thus, for even this relatively small'community we see that structural 
differentiation has proceeded far enough to generate relatively'stable 
coalitions that are activated differentially depending on the functional 
issue. Much more could be said about the internal structure of the varying 
coalitions, their influence resources, and preferred leadership strategies, 
which support some of the interpretations we have been making. Suffice 
it to say that we think this illustrative evidence provides sufficient in- 
dication of the ways in which our theoretical and methodological procedures 
greatly facilitate the systematic description of structural cleavage and 
consensus (e.g., it makes immediately obvious who would be "impossible" 
coaltion partners) and corresponds in fair approximation to the explicit 
structural-functional model we have been developing. Consensus-cleavage 
structures do change over time. We believe that the techniques we have de- 
scribed are capable of generating meaningful snapshots at particular points 
in time that in turn may be juxtaposed to describe stability and change in 
community influence structures. 
SUMMARY 
After briefly characterizing recent work in the study of community decision- 
making, we conclude that there appears to he some convergence on 
a number of common methodological strat-egies and theoretical and empirical 
assumptions. There still remain, however, important weaknesses in the 
overall theoretical framework and its implied methodology in directing 
research efforts. Attention is directed to a theoretically informed 
structural analysis of the community influence system that derives from a 
Parsonsian perspective. Several critical questions are raised concerning 
the identification of the relevant set of community influentials, the sys- 
tematic description of their attributes as influentials (including their 
institutional locations, influence resource bases, and attitudes and values), 
and the ties that bind them into shifting coalitions depending on the 
functional issue confronted. Recent methodological advances in graph 
theory and smallest space analysis are seen to provide means of examining 
the consensus-cleavage structure of community influence. Appropriate 
illustrations are drawn from the authors' case study of the community 
influence system in Altneustadt, a small city in West Germany. Highlights 
include a theoretically meaningful interpretation of a smallest space 
solution for the distribution fo community influence resource bases, the 
development of a rationale for describing differentiated social structures 
which are constructed from sociometric information on business/professiona1, 
social, and community affairs discussion partners within the elite, and 
some systematic hypotheses about the linkages among the three structures 
and between them and five selected issue outcomes. 
FOOTNOTES 
'Whether one uses individuals or positions as the primary units of analysis 
is not a problem peculiar to the study of elites. In some of the classic 
community studies social stratification was operationalized as the ranking 
of individuals or families along a common prestige continuum, whereas most 
structural approaches attempted to rank social positions, such as occupa- 
tions (cf. Lepsius, 1961) . 
2 
Parsons' AGIL paradigm was used as the analytic framework for classifying or- 
ganized collectivities according to their primary functional contributions 
to the community social system. Given the rather abstract character of 
the original formulations, there are some minor operational difficulties 
in coding organizations as belonging primarily in one of t.he four sectors. 
We coded business firms and banks as economic organizations with adaptive 
primacy; top governmental administrative positions, judges, and legislative 
decision-making bodies as having goal-attainment primacy to the extent that 
they make binding decisions for the community as a whole; voluntary associ- 
ations including unions and political parties as having integrative primacy 
as foci of interest group demands on the polity; and positions in educational, 
health, religious and cultural organizations as having pattern-maintenance 
primacy. Notars in Germany are a specialty in the legal profession con- 
cerned with economically relevant activities, such as the preparation of con- 
tracts and property transfers, and, consequently, were treated as in the adaptive 
sector. Although the Natural Science Reserach Center is the largest employer 
in Altneustadt, having many important ramifying economic consequences, 
we decided to code it as a pattern-maintenance collectivity, borh because 
its goal objectives are themselves distinctively cultural in their focus 
and consequences and because, from the community's point of view, it poses 
the distinctive problem of the assimilation of its personnel with their 
distinctive cultural characteristics into a more inclusive pattern of 
community life. 
3~eople who spent most of their time in non-authority positions are coded 
separately, thereby distinguishing them from individuals whose primary 
positions of authority are in economic, political, voluntary association, 
science center, religious or educational/cultural organizations. 
4 ~ w o  different questions were asked to measure the general influence rank. 
First, as already discussed, the respondents were asked to name all the 
persons of which they would say "that they are now in general very influen- 
tial in Altneustadt." Second, they were asked to indicate the top three 
persons from those they had identified in order of their community influence. 
The rank-order correlation between influence status on the basis of the 
simple number of mentions and on the basis of a weighted sum of nominations 
for the top three influentials is .837 (N = 31). Given the very high cor- 
relation between the two procedures and the fact that the "simple mentions" 
method provide an order for the entire sample while the "top threeff method 
covered only the top 31 persons, we have decided to use the simpler measure 
for our measure of influence status. 
We also note that each respondent was asked to name other people 
whom he felt should be included in our list of community influentials. 
While a number of suggested additions were made, all but one were mentioned 
only once. The exception received five nominations and was, consequently, 
added to our list and interviewed. 
5 ~ y  looking at means and variances in th.e influence ranks attached to an 
issue, we are also able to assess the degree to which a given issue-tended 
to be confined to the higher reaches of the set of influentials (so to 
speak, an internal elite disagreenent) or was a broader-based community 
issue which involved the mobilization of personnel outside of the top in- 
fluential group. 
6 
Clark's thirteen resources include money and credit, control over jobs, 
control of mass media, high social status, knowledge and specialized tech- 
nical skills, popularity and esteemed personal qualities, legality, sub- 
system solidarity, the right to vote, social access to community leaders, 
commitments of followers, manpower and control of organizations, and con- 
trol over the interpretation of values (seea also damson, 1968: 59-109). 
7 ~ h e  actual text of the question was as follows: 
Q. 40. Usually persons are regarded as significant and influential in 
a community because of certain personal characteristics or resources. We 
have written down here some such possibilities. (Hand over the list.) One 
can, for example, be influential on the basis of an official position in the 
city administration or as an elected public official, which corresponds to 
our first point, or because one has at his disposal economic resources such 
as money, land, or jobs. This would correspond to our points 2 and 3 which 
we have differentiated according to the fluidity of the resource, that is, 
between money on the one side and land and jobs on the other. Then there 
are experts in specific fields which are influential because of their ex- 
pertzse -- that is our point 4 -- or persons who can accomplish a great 
deal through their good connections with other influential people in and 
outside of the city -- that is our point 5. One can also be influential 
in, a community because he is known as someone who makes good suggestions 
and who can mobilize the people for these proposals as a good speaker. 
This is our point 6. Our point 7 describes the honorable broker and point 8 
the representative of specific subgroups of the population. Could you 
please indicate for the persons on our list for whom you believe yourself 
capable of an exact judgment, the most important characteristics or resources 
which this person possesses? In the case of a person for whom several pos- 
sibilities are relevant, please give me the characteristic or resource which 
you regard as the most important. 
(1) Official decision-making authority as an elected public official or 
occupant of a high position in the public service. 
(2) Power of disposal over fluid capital, possible giver of credit. 
(3) Power of disposal over less fluid economic resources such as land 
or jobs. 
(4) Special expert knowledge of certain delimited fields of community 
interest. 
(5) Good connections with influential persons in and outside of 
Altneustadt. 
(6) General respect as someone who can mobilize the public for good 
proposals in the interest of the city as a whole. 
(7) Honorable (widely respected) broker who can mediate in a non-partisan 
way points at issue. 
(8) Influence in certain subgroups of the population such as voters 
of a particular party, members of a voluntary assoication, and so on,. 
(9) Other (please get exact particulars). 
8 A cautionary note should be interjected here: given the wide scatter of 
points and the fact that there are only.eight points, interpretation of 
the underlying structure cannot be as confident as when there are many 
points in a given region to help define its "meaning". But with that 
caveat in mind, there is nevertheless a remarkable correspondence between 
our theoretical expectations and -the empirical results. 
9"~nterview schedule for panel of community elites',' question 14, National 
Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, undated. (cf. Clark, 1968~). 
'%ou may have noticed by now that our treatment of the question of describing 
social structures rests on a fairly explicit physical analogy. There are 
always a number of pitfalls in taking any analogy too literally. Certainly 
one must be warned against assuming that he shall be able to make such 
statements as the following: In Structure Z, Position A is twice the 
distance from Position B as from Position C. We can, however, assert that, 
assuming a reasonably good smallest space solution, Position Byis, relatively 
speaking, farther from Position A than Position C. In short, we can make 
statements at the level of the rank-order of positions. 
11 
Three questions are the source of information on these relationships: 
433. Would you please indicate the three persons from the list with 
whom you most frequently meet socially (privately)? 
437. Could you now indicate the three persons out of our list with 
whom you have the closest business or professional contact? 
438. Could you please indicate the three persons with whom you most 
frequently discuss community affairs? 
12 
See Alba and Kadushin (1970) for a rather similar approach based on 
graph theoretic notions but using a different graphic technique. 
13 
Often assuming a ruling elite model of community decision-making, critics 
of the issue-approach (cf. Bachrach and Boratz, 1962, 1963) have identified 
another important criticism by pointing to the "non-issue" problem in 
communities dominated by a ruling faction that so controls the community 
agenda that "important" and consequential matters never come up for general 
community discussion and decision. 
14L7e are inclined to agree with such commentators as Ossowski (1963), 
Lenski (1966), and Stinchcombe (1'968) that Marxian and functionally oriented 
perspectives are by no means as radically incompatible as has sometimes 
been assumed. There are, of course, obvious differences of emphasis and 
concern between them. One important difference is the tendency for Marxian 
oriented analysts to see instrumental issues as forming the fundamental 
substrate of community controversy, whether actual or potential; while 
functionalists tend to accord expressive issues pride of place, seeing dis- 
agreements among groups concerning fundamental values to arise from con- 
siderations other than simply their different relations to the economic 
structure. 
15*he coding of an issue into its appropriate functional sector is not a 
simple matter of identifying the institutional sector of the callectivities 
most likely to be affected. For example, a school bond issue is obviously 
concerned at some level with the educational system, which is usually treated 
as an entity functionally specialized with regard to pattern maintenance. 
But the issue may develop in two quite different directions. It may be 
regarded as a purely instrumental issue whether the community can afford 
to pay for another school, given its other current obligations. Its 
functional locus is, therefore, integrative as it concerns the estab- 
lishment of its claim of priority in the allocative scheme '(budget) of 
scarce community resources among competing alternatives. But the issue 
:. may become a consummatory or expressive issue by focusing not on costs 
but on what type of school program is to be implemented in the proposed 
new building. In this case, prospective changes in the organization of 
pattern-maintenance activities are at issue. 
16~ltneustadt actually confronted issues b, c, and d in the past several 
years. But because it had not confronted issues having special relevance 
to the economic subsystem in the recent past and because we saw the city 
as having especially acute pattern-maintenance problems due to the rapid 
in-migration of distinctive newcomers, we decided to develop two hypo- 
thetical issues (a and e) for these two sectors. (See Perrucci and Pilisuk, 
1970, for another recent study employing hypothetical issues.) Both 
of these issues were quite realistic in that they could easily become 
matters of public or elite debate in the immediately forseeable future. 
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